As the era of unusually low interest rates comes to a close, it is worth paying attention to what rate of interest the courts are likely to allow in relation to successful financial claims.
Statue provides that in general terms once judgment has been granted in the English courts, interest of 8% per annum will be awarded on the judgment sum until it is paid.
Financiers have been, together with almost all other litigants, subject to what seems to be an ever-increasing spiral of expense in navigating the various fees and charges payable under the court system, a trend which is been in place now for almost 2 decades.
We were rather surprised recently to see a commercial law firm attempt to impose Third Party Debt Orders (“TPDOs”) both on an invoice financier and on debtors whose debts had been assigned to it, in each case in favour of a claimant who had secured a court judgment against the assignor.
TPDOs were formerly known as Garnishee orders, and are governed by Rule 72 of the Civil Procedure Rules which provides:
In a recent Briefing we commented on the case of Haydock Finance Limited v Starcruiser Bussing Limited [2021] EWHC 622 (Comm) in which we successfully represented a funder in defeating an unmeritorious challenge, backed up by the debtor’s “expert evidence,” to the technical aspects of an asset financier’s securitisation process: see https://www.bermans.co.uk/securitisation-and-the-right-to-sue/
We wondered whether this sort of challenge might spread across to invoice finance, so we were interested to see the Court of Appeal reject a series of technical challenges to the assignment process in the recent judgment in a series of cases reported at [2021] EWCA Civ 1682.
The business of law has changed significantly over the last couple of decades, ranging from significant developments in terms of the structure and operation of commercial law firms servicing business clients, to the funding models of “ambulance chasing” litigation covering a wide range of claims from alleged financial mis-selling to simple road traffic accident claims.
It is some time since we examined the topic of invoice finance for lawyers in a Briefing, and we were reminded of its significance in a recent court judgement involving a claim by a funder against a solicitor’s insurer which would have been of great interest to the invoice finance industry had it succeeded.
As we are moving towards the second anniversary of the pandemic it is worth pausing to reflect that, after some initial reluctance, technology has been quite successfully embraced both by lawyers and also by the courts to keep the system running.
Obviously meetings between lawyers and clients have largely been replaced by virtual contact through Microsoft Teams and Zoom, but virtual contact has now taken a firm foothold in relation to the litigation process.
The Court of Appeal has recently handed down judgment in Wood v Commercial First Business Ltdand Others and Business Mortgage Finance 4 plc v Pengelly [2021] EWCA Civ 471, on the issue of broker “secret commissions”.
These decisions have caused something of a storm in the asset finance industry but the implications are not limited to asset finance, and somewhat surprisingly in our view the NACFB is recommending “both regulated and unregulated firms, working in all sectors, should be transparent about their commissions and fully disclose the amount of commission received”.
In our view it may be a little premature to raise the white flag on the question of disclosing the amount of commission to invoice finance clients unless they ask for that information. In both Wood and Pengelly, the broker’s terms and conditions notified the mortgagors that the broker “may” receive fees from creditors with whom it placed mortgages. If the terms had stopped here, then these would have been “half secret” cases (with the wording resembling that in Hurstanger Limited v Wilson [2007] 1 WLR 2351). However, the terms went on to promise that in the event commission was paid, the mortgagors would receive notification of the amount. Given the finding of fact that no such notification was received, the court correctly categorised these as fully secret cases.
As long ago as 2001 in the landmark case of Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v Etridge [2001] UKHL 44 the House of Lords significantly extended the circumstances in which a financier will be put on constructive notice of misrepresentation or undue influence committed against an individual executing a Guarantee or other security, but there remains a great deal of misunderstanding of the relevant principles.
The mischief addressed 20 years ago by the House of Lords arose from wives regularly being misled or unduly pressured by husbands into signing Guarantees or executing Charges in favour of creditors, but the protection afforded by the law extends much further.
We came across an interesting argument concerning the right to sue after securitisation of assets in a recent reported case we ran for an asset finance company, Haydock Finance Limited v Starcruiser Bussing Limited [2021] EWHC 622 (Comm).
The case involved commercial vehicles and acting for the funder we brought a claim against the hirer for return of the vehicles and the guarantor for a substantial sum. There appeared to be no merit whatsoever in the Defence as served, but by the time of the hearing the Defendants turned up with a so-called “Securitisation Analysis Report” prepared by an academic in California who describes himself as an “Expert Analysis on Auto Agreement Backed Securities Data.”
On 1 December 2020 Crown preference in relation to unpaid taxes reappeared on the insolvency landscape for the first time since the abolition of the doctrine in the Enterprise Act 2002.
Debts owed to HMRC are now to rank as secondary preferential debts, ranking after employees’ preferential claims but, importantly, before claims of floating charge holders.